Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases by Oechssler, Jörg et al.
 
 
 
 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  H e i d e l b e r g   
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper Series    No. 465 
Cognitive Abilities and 
Behavioral Biases 
Joerg Oechssler,
Andreas Roider, and
Patrick W. Schmitz
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2008 
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases
Jörg Oechssler
Department of Economics
University of Heidelberg
Andreas Roidery
Department of Economics
University of Heidelberg
Patrick W. Schmitz
Department of Economics
University of Cologne
May 19, 2008
Abstract
We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether es-
tablished behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics
and nance are related to cognitive abilities. We nd that higher test scores
on the Cognitive Reection Test of Frederick (2005) indeed are correlated with
lower incidences of the conjunction fallacy, conservatism in updating probabil-
ities, and overcondence. Test scores are also signicantly related to subjects
time and risk preferences. We nd no inuence on anchoring. However, even
if biases are lower for people with higher cognitive abilities, they still remain
substantial.
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nance, biases, cognitive abilities, cognitive reection
test.
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1 Introduction
Why should economists be interested in behavioral biases and cognitive abilities?
The traditional view in economics and nance is that only outcomes matter. There
is a strong presumption that behavioral biases do not play a role in the aggregate
because either they are averaged out or they are corrected for by rational arbitrage.
However, Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue forcefully that arbitrage cannot elimi-
nate all e¤ects of behavioral biases in nancial markets.1 But even if it could, on the
individual level it would certainly still be valuable information if one could somehow
discriminate between individuals that are less or more a­ icted by behavioral phe-
nomena. For example, this information would be useful when applied to potential
employees or customers. In particular, if a concise test were available that could
be administered in a few minutes but would reveal a lot about the probability that
those individuals exhibit a number of wellknown biases in decision-making, such a
test should be quite instructive.
In this paper we provide an experimental test for the hypothesis that the in-
cidence of behavioral biases is related to cognitive abilities. For it to be useful, a
test for cognitive abilities must be short and simple. One such test is suggested by
Frederick (2005) who shows that his Cognitive Reection Test (CRT), which is a
brief 3item test that can be conducted in less than ve minutes, is a good predictor
of cognitive abilities, in particular with respect to mathematical abilities.
A number of recent studies have already demonstrated two stylized facts about
the relationship between cognitive ability and economic behavior (see Frederick,
2005; Benjamin et al., 2006; Slonim et al., 2007, and Dohmen et al., 2007). First,
individuals with high cognitive abilities seem to be less risk averse when gambling
in the positive domain.2 Second, they seem to be more patient.3
In this study, we replicate those earlier studies (and their main ndings) with
respect to risk and time preferences. But we also extend the hypothesis to a number
of biases that play a crucial role, for example, in the behavioral nance literature
1Such limits to arbitrage might, for example, arise from fundamental risk (e.g., due to the lack
of short-selling opportunities), noise trader risk (see e.g., De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997), or implementation costs (see e.g., Summers, 1986; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002). See also
Shleifer (2000).
2See, however, BranasGarza et al. (2008) who do not nd evidence for a relationship between
a GRE-like math test and risk attitudes.
3Moreover, for a representative sample of the German population, Dohmen et al. (2008) nd
that participantseducation levels are systematically related to being prone to the gamblers fallacy
(respectively, the hot hand fallacy).
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(see Barberis and Thaler, 2003, for a comprehensive survey). In particular, we study
the conjunction fallacy, anchoring, overcondence, and conservatism with respect to
probability updating. We nd that individuals with low CRT scores are signicantly
more likely to be subject to the conjunction fallacy, to conservatism with respect to
probability updating, and to overcondence. We nd no signicant di¤erence with
respect to anchoring.
2 Experimental Design
In total, 1250 subjects participated in our online, web-based experiment. After
logging in on our website and providing some personal background information,
all participants played a one-shot mini-ultimatum game (see our companion paper,
Oechssler et al., 2008 for results). A subset of 564 subjects also answered a ques-
tionnaire with several decision-problems related to the wellknown behavioral biases
discussed above, and our results relate to this subset of subjects. Mixed in among
those questions were the three questions that make up the Cognitive Reection Test.
A translation of the instructions can be found in the Appendix.
2.1 Cognitive Reection Test
The Cognitive Reection Test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005) is a quick and
simple three-item test, and Frederick (2005) documents that the CRT compares very
favorably (in terms of the relationship between test scores and observed behavior)
to substantially more complex personality tests. The CRT di¤erentiates between
more impulsive and more reective decision-makers. To achieve this, each of the
three questions of the CRT has a seemingly intuitive (but incorrect) answer that
springs quickly to mind, and the overwhelming majority of subjects indeed provides
either the impulsive or the correct response (more than 90% of subjects in all three
questions). The questions of the CRT are not di¢ cult in the sense that the correct
solution is easily understood when explained to subjects. Moreover, if a solution
springs to mind it is easy for subjects to verify whether their response is indeed
correct. However, arriving at the correct answer may require overcoming the initial,
impulsive response. The CRT consists of the following three questions.
 A bat and a ball together cost 110 cents. The bat costs 100 cents more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? (impulsive answer: 10 cents; correct
answer: 5 cents).
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 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets? (impulsive answer: 100 minutes; correct
answer: 5 minutes).
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake? (impulsive answer: 24 days; correct
answer: 47 days).
The average CRT score (i.e., the average number of correct responses) in our sam-
ple was 2.05, which places our subjects well between students of MIT and Princeton
in Fredericks (2005) sample. Of our subjects, 41.5% answered all three questions
correctly, 30.7% answered two questions correctly, 17.7% answered one question
correctly, and the remaining 10.1% answered none of the questions correctly. As
in Frederick (2005), male subjects received a higher average test score (2.2) than
female subjects (1.7), which is a signicant di¤erence (p < 0:001, MWUtest).4
2.2 Recruiting and Payment
Subjects were recruited via emails. Email addresses were obtained from the eco-
nomic experimental laboratories in Bonn, Cologne, and Mannheim. All those con-
tacted had indicated their interest in participating in economic experiments. Of the
participants, 90% were university students, 25% studied economics or business, and
46% were female. Average age of participants was 24 years.
The website was linked to the Laboratory for Experimental Research in Eco-
nomics at the University of Bonn to demonstrate that the experiment had a proper
scientic background and that the promised nancial rewards were credible. To
prevent subjects from playing multiple times, each name-postal code combination
and each email address was only allowed to play once.5
In addition to the payo¤ from the ultimatum game, which ranged from 0 to 8
euros for each participant, subjects were told that six of them would be drawn at
random and paid according to their answers in the questionnaire (see the Appendix
for details). All questions about risk preferences involved lotteries that were actually
played out according to subjects chosen alternatives. Answers to the question
4However, the CRT does not merely proxy for gender as our below results continue to hold
qualitatively when the analysis is done separately for men and women.
5For a more detailed discussion of methodological issues related to internet experiments, see e.g.,
Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005, 2007).
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about time preferences decided whether subjects would receive their accumulated
experimental payments through a bank transfer immediately or with 10% interest
in one months time (and this was, of course, known to subjects). Average payo¤
for the subjects who were paid for their answers was 151.13 euros.
3 Results
Table 1 lists the main results of our questionnaire. For each item, we present data
for a Low CRT group, which are those subjects that correctly answered 0 or
1 question on the CRT, and a High CRT group, which are subjects with 2 or
3 correct answers.6 We consider the Low group as the subset of more impulsive
decision makers, whereas the High group consists of the more reective decision
makers. The main question of our study is whether more reective decision makers
are less likely to display biases in decision making, which, for example, are commonly
studied in behavioral nance. Before turning to these biases, we report our results
on risk and time preferences, which have already been the subject of earlier studies.
Risk preferences. Items 1 and 2 in Table 1 present results for two lottery
choice questions in which subjects have to choose between a sure payment of x and
a lottery where they have a 75% probability of getting 2x and a 25% probability of
getting 0. Item 1 is in the domain of gains (x = 10e), Item 2 is in the domain of
losses (x =  10e). For both items, the High CRT group is more likely to choose
the alternative that is compatible with risk neutrality. However, although we use
lotteries similar to those of Frederick (2005), we nd much less evidence for loss
aversion than he nds. Only about 7.7% of Low types and 2.9% of High types chose
the sure payment in the domain of gains and the lottery in the domain of losses.7
Time preferences. Again supporting earlier evidence,8 we nd that Low CRT
types are less patient than High CRT types, although the di¤erence is signicant
at the 10% level only. The test question asked subjects whether they would choose
to receive their payment for the experiment now or rather in one month with 10%
interest. Compared to Frederick (2005), who elicited time preferences through a sim-
ilar question, our subjects are, however, generally much more patient (the monthly
6Splitting subjects into extreme groups of those that answered 0 or 3 questions correctly would
not alter results qualitatively. However, the group with 0 correct answers is relatively small.
7Although Frederick (2005) does not report individual data on how many subjects chose a gamble
in losses while choosing the sure payo¤ in gains, his aggregate data show that 54% of the Low CRT
subjects gamble in losses while only 19% do so in gains.
8See e.g., Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006), Slonim et al. (2007) and Dohmen et al. (2007).
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interest rate in Frederick is at 11.8% comparable to our 10%).9
Table 1: Behavioral biases and CRT scores
category item CRT group sign. level
Low High
risk
% preferring e10 for sure to
75% chance of winning e 20
66.0% 47.7% p < 0:001
% preferring   e10 for sure to
75% chance of losing   e20 88.5% 95.1% p < 0:005
time
% preferring payment now rather
than 10% more in 1 month
12.9% 8.1% p < 0:09
conjunction
% thinking Linda bank teller less
likely than bank teller & feminist
62.6% 38.3% p < 0:001
conservatism
avg. assessed prob. for urn A
(correct prob.: 0.97)
0.59 0.69 p < 0:001
anchoring
avg. guess when anchor 60  
avg. guess when anchor 10
7.8 10.6 n.s.
overconf.
% assessing their own # of
correct answers correctly
9.7% 67.8% p < 0:001
Note: Number of obs. for CRT group Low (CRT scores of 0 or 1): 157, for CRT group High
(CRT scores of 2 or 3): 407. Signicance levels refer to two-sided 2-tests (rst 4 categories) or
MWU-tests (last 3 categories), respectively, for di¤erences between CRT groups.
Conjunction Fallacy. Subjects were presented the following story due to
Kahneman and Tversky (1974): Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. Then, they were asked to indicate which of the following two
statements is more likely to be true: 1) Linda is a bank teller. 2) Linda is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement. Of our subjects in the Low CRT group,
62.6% thought that 1) is less likely than 2), which, of course, is impossible. This
percentage is much lower for the High CRT group at 38.3% (p < 0:001, 2test).
Conservatism. In an experiment rst run by Edwards (1968), subjects were
asked the following question. Imagine there are two urns - urn A and urn B. Urn
A contains 3 blue balls and 7 red balls. Urn B contains 7 blue balls and 3 red balls.
Balls are now randomly drawn from one of these urns where the drawn ball is always
9Note that most subjects in Fredericks (2005) study received a show-up fee only, i.e., his time-
preference question was hypothetical.
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placed back into the same urn. Twelve such random draws yielded 8 red balls and 4
blue balls. What do you estimate the probability that the balls were drawn from urn
A?The correct answer is 0.97, but most subjects will say something much closer
to the base rate of 0.5. Again, subjects in the High CRT group are less a¤ected
by this bias in our experiment. The average probability for the High CRT group is
0.69, which is signicantly higher than the 0.59 of the Low CRT group (p < 0:001,
MWUtest).
Anchoring. When forming estimates, people often start with some initial, pos-
sibly arbitrary value, and then (insu¢ ciently) adjust away from it. This e¤ect is
called anchoring (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Half of our subjects received the
following question: Do you believe that more or less than 10% of all participants
answered all three [CRT] questions correctly?The second half received the same
question with the anchor 10% replaced by the anchor 60%. Thereafter, all sub-
jects were asked: What do you think, what is the percentage of participants who
answered all three [CRT] questions correctly?We nd a signicant e¤ect of anchor-
ing in both CRT groups. When the anchor is 10%, average guesses are about 43%.
When the anchor is 60%, average guesses are about 52%. This di¤erence is signi-
cant at p < 0:01 according to a MWUtest. Furthermore, the e¤ect of anchoring is
not diminished by cognitive ability. In fact, if anything, the High CRT group seems
to be more susceptible to anchoring, although this e¤ect is not signicant (see Table
1).
Overcondence. We asked each subject to estimate the number of questions
on the CRT that he had solved correctly. The fraction of subjects who judge their
performance in the CRT correctly is dramatically higher for the High CRT group at
67.8% than for the Low group (9.7%). Of course, this has to do with the property
of the CRT questions that induce impulsive decision makers to judge their intuitive
but wrong answers as correct. In fact, very few subjects underestimated their per-
formance (1% of subjects in the Low CRT group, less than 5% in the high CRT
group).
4 Conclusion
In a largescale internet-based experiment, we studied the relationship between
cognitive abilities and biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics
and nance. To measure cognitive abilities we used the Cognitive Reection Test
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(CRT) rst introduced by Frederick (2005), which has several desirable properties.
The test is very short and easy to conduct. Moreover, it has been shown to be
able to discriminate well between impulsive and reective decision makers, and our
hypothesis was that this distinction matters for the extent to which individuals
would display some of the wellknown behavioral biases.
This hypothesis was largely conrmed in the sense that biases are signicantly
more pronounced for individuals with low cognitive abilities. In particular, we found
that, as in earlier studies, risk aversion in the positive domain and impatience were
signicantly more pronounced among individuals with low test scores on the CRT.
But we also found that individuals with low CRT scores were signicantly more likely
to be subject to the conjunction fallacy, to conservatism with respect to probability
updating, and to overcondence. We found no signicant di¤erence with respect to
anchoring.
We should be careful to point out, though, that our ndings do not imply that
behavioral biases are unimportant in nancial markets on the grounds that market
participants are likely to have high cognitive abilities.10 Although we found signi-
cant inuences of cognitive abilities on behavioral biases, even the group with high
cognitive abilities showed substantial incidences of all the biases we studied.
10For example, Christelis et al. (2006) document a positive relationship between mathematical
skills, verbal uency, and recall skills and the level of stock market participation.
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5 Appendix: Instructions
In the following we present an English translation of the German instructions. Sub-
sequent to entering their personal data (such as address, age, gender, and eld of
study), subjects played an (unrelated) mini-ultimatum game. Afterwards, they pro-
ceeded to a questionnaire containing various decision problems, which are the topic
of the present paper. The post-experimental questionnaire also contained additional,
unrelated questions pertaining to behavior in the ultimatum game.
Questionnaire
Some questions
We would be delighted if you could answer a few additional questions. The answers
will take a few minutes only.
In addition, you can win a prize of up to 265 euros: At the end of the experiment we
will randomly draw 6 out of the 600 participants that will be paid for their answers
in the following way.11 Please note that prizes will be positive. A winner will obtain:
 As a thank you for answering all of the questions a lump sum of 60 euros.
 For questions 1, 4, 6, 8, and 10: 5 euros for each correct answer.
 For questions 3 and 5: The amount in euros that is realized in the respective
lottery (we will actually carry out the lotteries).
 For questions 9 and 11: For each of the questions 10 euros minus an amount
that is increasing in the deviation of your answer from the correct answer.
Formally, we use the following formula: 10  (1   ((correct answer your
answer)=100)2). Here is an example: Your answer is 70%. Suppose the correct
answer is 50%. The resulting payo¤ for this question is 10  (1   0:22) = 9:6
euros.
 For question 7: 10 euros minus an amount that is increasing in the deviation of
your answer from the correct answer. Formally, we use the following formula:
10  (correct answer   your answer)2.
11While this phase of the experiment was designed for 600 participants, only 564 subjects lled
in the questionnaire raising the individual probability to win a prize.
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Questions:
1. A bat and a ball together cost 110 cents. The bat costs 100 cents more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? [ _____ cents ]
2. If you are one of the six winners who receive a prize for this questionnaire,
you can pick between two alternatives. Alternative 1: We will transfer your
winnings immediately after the end of the experiment. Alternative 2: We will
transfer your winnings one month after the end of the experiment with a 10%
premium. Which alternative do you choose? [1/2]
3. You have the choice between two alternatives. Alternative 1: You receive 10
euros. Alternative 2: You receive a lottery ticket that yields a 75% chance of
winning 20 euros. With 25% probability it is worthless. Which alternative do
you choose? [1/2]
4. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets? [ ____ minutes ]
5. You have to pay 10 euros. Would you rather replace this payment through
the following alternative: With a probability of 75% you must pay 20 euros.
With 25% probability you dont have to pay anything. [yes/no]
6. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake? [ ____ days ]
You have just answered three questions about the prices of a bat and a ball (B),
about the production time of certain machines (M) and about a patch of lily pads
(P). In the following we shall refer to these three questions as BMPquestions.12
7. What do you think, how many of the BMPquestions did you answer correctly?
[0,1,2,3]
8. Do you believe that more or less than 10% [60%] of all participants answered
all three BMPquestions correctly? [less/more]
12At this stage, subjects were prevented from going back to alter their responses to these ques-
tions.
11
9. What do you think, what is the percentage of participants who answered all
three BMPquestions correctly? [number between 0 and 100]
10. Consider the following description. Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken,
and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated
in anti-nuclear demonstrations.Which of the following two statements is more
likely to be true? Statement 1: Linda is a bank teller. Statement 2: Linda
is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. [1/2]
11. Imagine there are two urns urn A and urn B. Urn A contains 3 blue balls
and 7 red balls. Urn B contains 7 blue balls and 3 red balls. Balls are now
randomly drawn from one of these urns where the drawn ball is always placed
back into the same urn. Twelve such random draws yielded 8 red balls and 4
blue balls. What do you estimate the probability that the balls were drawn
from urn A? [Please enter a number between 0 and 100, where 100 means it
was certainly urn Aand 0 means it was certainly urn B]
12
